From SimpleCoach

A more honest design

Part One – The Trap Door is a Business Model Problem

Part Two – The Promotion and Relegation Thesis

Part Three – What the Old System was Built to Do

Part Four – The Super League: the elite’s answer to the same problem

Part Five – The United States, by Contrast

If the aim is for clubs to still exist and maintain a healthy balance sheet in year five, and we get to experience club continuity and longevity, the choices look plainer, and less pure.  We can start by not promoting a club that cannot manage higher division economics for three years without an angel investor or deep pocketed owner. Japan is right about that part. I do not know why we would deliberately put a club into a cost structure it has not shown it can survive. The gap between divisions should be uncomfortable, without a doubt.  It should not be an event that decides whether the club exists or not.

Revenue share payments, as was enacted by USL, or a similar mechanism that flattens second-tier economics should be a precondition, not the lousy T-shirt you get after the damage happens. A three-year parachute that dwarfs every other club in the division is an admission that the bar was set too high. It would be better to distribute it more evenly across all the clubs.  The Championship is already saying this to the Premier League, more loudly than the Premier League wants to hear.  I suspect the Independent Regulator will force the Premier League to increase annual payments to support the pyramid because currently, in its current form, it is not sustainable.

That said, perhaps rather than payments made from the top league, there is a share of ownership.  Your league determines a % of ownership in an overall professional pyramid.  If your club is promoted, your share increases, and likewise if you are relegated, your share decreases.  There is no easy way to avoid the pitfalls of relegation, but perhaps there is a way to add a degree of certainty.

This would assume that MLS and USL would be working together on this plan (which would be a challenge unto itself…), but you could have an ownership stake in the whole pyramid depending on your club status.  The top division would get the largest share of revenues, and it would decline the farther you fall.  But at a minimum a club could plan for its fate and know that there is a share they will receive on an annual basis.

For illustration purposes, starting with a pyramid that has 4 divisions, there is a pooled revenue fund of $100,000,000 per year, made up of pooled sponsorship, media, and other league wide revenue sources.  With 20 teams per division, it would look as follows –

If you are in the top division, and you are generating $75 million in annual revenue, you would also receive $3 million from the pool.    If you were relegated, your share of the pool would decrease to $1,250,000.  There is a challenge that can’t be addressed wholesale and that is the inherent economic differences between divisions.  But this hybrid model provides at least a guaranteed source of revenue tied to pyramid performance.  The better it does, the increase in total revenue.  This moves beyond the idea of solidarity payments or parachute payments as a mechanism to support lower division clubs. 

You could design it so that your “share” of the pyramid is recalculated based on the division your club is in over the previous 3 years.  You could also design it so that there is a fixed percentage plus a variable amount based on your progress throughout the pyramid.

The benefit to this hybrid model is that every club is invested in the pyramid’s financial health.  There would have to be compromises around the annual fund and financial obligations of every club across every division.  But the point is to get every club to have a commitment to the health of the hybrid pyramid.  I am sure the purists will have objections, but if you want to have a unified structure with promotion and relegation, these compromises may be worth making.   

This will also hit purists like a ton of bricks but perhaps guarantee a period of time in the higher division, with relegation as the penalty for sporting and financial failure, not as the annual feature. A closed first division (like MLS) with promotion and relegation in the lower divisions, or promotion only when the table and the audit both clear, will offend people who want a morality play. They are also more likely to leave a stadium standing.

Let’s be clear: the traditional open pyramid is not a sacrament. It is a late-Victorian membership rule that Europe copied because the clubs were already there. The product, the labor market, and the people lending against the stadium have all changed. The table does not have to stay frozen in 1898 because the clubs were.

Truthfully, I can live with romance, fifty years in the game will do that. What I cannot accept is treating a single summer that wipes out roughly 70 percent of revenue (in the worst case) while leaving the wage bill intact as part of the charm. At some point, rational minds must confront the economics of modern soccer and find ways to strengthen clubs rather than strain them further each season.

And in the least shocking news around the economics of an open pyramid, the Independent Football Regulator released the anticipated State of the Game report in the UK.  Among some of its findings are first, player wages have gone up 33% in the Prem should surprise no one. But what should shock everyone is that in League One, player costs have increased 71% since 2021/22 and 63% in League Two. Second, for every pound of revenue, a League One club need 72p of external financing…. think loans, owner funds… Third, only roughly a quarter of clubs not in the premier can survive longer than 90 days without owner funding. Fourth, 60% of EFL and National League clubs have negative equity and “are technically insolvent.” Fifth, this is something that surprised me… only 60% of clubs own their own stadiums. As a result “At the bottom end of the pyramid, the financial model of football clubs faces the most intense strain.” And finally, “At a system-wide level, football is not self sufficient and is systemically vulnerable if economic circumstances worsen or investor appetite slows.”[1]

The EPL has something the United States does not have.  They are large enough where they have government constraints and an interest in their stability.  As a result, I am sure this will be resolved with some half measures that buy the league a decade before these irregularities happen again. But in the United States, the survival of leagues and clubs is solely dependent upon it’s financial health.  There is no way around that fact.

Part Seven – Why the Structure Fails as a Modern Business

Part Eight – The Final Whistle


[1] The Independent Football Regulator, 2026 State of the Game, 13 October, 2026

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