The Super League: the elite’s answer to the same problem
Part One – The Trap Door is a Business Model Problem
Part Two – The Promotion and Relegation Thesis
Part Three – What the Old System was Built to Do
In April 2021 twelve clubs tried to solve the business problem this paper describes by walking out of the membership rule altogether. Real Madrid, Barcelona, Atlético Madrid, Juventus, Inter, Milan, and the Premier League’s self-appointed Big Six announced a European Super League.[1] Florentino Pérez of Real Madrid became its chairman. The pitch was “rescue,” not greed. Pérez said the pandemic had left the big clubs “ruined,” that football would be “dead” by 2024 without a new competition, and that more midweek games among famous names were the only way to replace lost income. According to Pérez, “It’s a league to save all the clubs. Otherwise, soccer will die.” UEFA’s Champions League, in his telling, no longer produced the money required to “save football.”[2]
Twenty clubs. Fifteen of them Founding Members with a permanent seat. Five annual qualifiers as decoration. Founders would split a reported $4.1 billion signing-on pot and then keep the broadcast and commercial surplus among themselves instead of recycling it through UEFA to smaller leagues. There was no relegation for the fifteen. A bad season in La Liga or the Premier League would not cost them the midweek product, the media contract, or the valuation bump that comes from owning a share of a closed competition. American owners at Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United understood that last part immediately.
It was not a random coup against tradition. It was the richest clubs in open leagues trying to buy the one feature closed leagues already sell: tenure. Real Madrid and Barcelona felt the squeeze first. They are member-owned giants competing in a domestic league whose television deal is smaller than the Premier League’s, carrying wage bills set by a global market, and relying on Champions League qualification that is annual rather than contractual. A single poor league season is not relegation from La Liga. It is the threat of falling out of the only competition that keeps the books close to viable. Pérez’s project locked the door at a continental level so those clubs would never again have to underwrite first-tier costs with a second-tier European risk.
The public responded as expected. With shock and anger. Guaranteed seats for a self-appointed fifteen were the feature fans, governments, and UEFA named as the original sin. Within seventy-two hours the six English clubs were gone.[3] Atlético and the Milan clubs followed. Real Madrid, Barcelona, and for a time Juventus stayed.
What followed is just as revealing. UEFA changed the Champions League … more guaranteed matches and a league phase … so the elite would get more of what they had demanded without creating a breakaway competition. A22, the vehicle behind the Super League, spent the next years in court. On 21 December 2023 the EU Court of Justice held that UEFA and FIFA’s prior-approval rules abused a dominant position.[4] Within hours A22 announced a new, “open” Super League: Star, Gold, and Blue tiers, no permanent members, promotion and relegation between them. Later versions rebranded as the Unify League and talked about qualifying through domestic leagues. [5] They changed the approach because of the backlash. Everything after that has been an attempt to sell permanence in the language of sporting merit.
Tottenham’s 2025-26 season made the arithmetic public: a club carrying a Premier League and European cost structure spent the spring fighting relegation, with independent estimates putting the one-year revenue hit of a drop into the Championship on the order of roughly $300–350 million. England already answers that cliff with parachute payments.
The Super League was the clubs at the top of the European cliff deciding that the honest business answer was to stop climbing and stop falling—to incorporate the cliff as a private league and leave everyone else on the slope. [6] As long as qualification for the richest midweek games remains a yearly referendum on a balance sheet built for permanence, someone will try to come up with a way to mitigate these disruptions.[7]
Part Five – The United States, by Contrast
Part Six – A More Honest Design
Part Seven – Why the Structure Fails as a Modern Business
Part Eight – The Final Whistle
[1] Crafton, Adam; Matt Slater; James Horncastle; Dan Sheldon. European Super League Explained: The Contracts, Plots and Threats that Shook Football to its Core. The Athletic. 19 April, 2021
[2] Azzoni, Tales. Pérez: Super League being created to ‘save soccer’. AP News. 19 April 2021
[3] Hamilton, Todd. Super League collapses: How fan reaction, revolt helped end English clubs’ breakaway. ESPN.com. 22 April, 2021
[4] CJEU decides in Favour of the European Super League and declares FIFA & UEFA rules as contrary to EU. Chambers.com. 31 May 2024 The Court did not rule “in favour of the European Super League.” See Case C-333/21, 21 December 2023.
[5] Benge, James. European Super League Explained: New 80-Team Competition Proposed in Multi-Division Format. CBS Sports. 9 February 2023.
[6] See the appendix for additional information on how each country manages promotion and relegation.
[7] My personal sense is that this debate is far from done. I think at some point one of the largest, richest clubs will end up being relegated. This will lead to some lawsuits to prevent the club from having to descend. I think the test case would have been Spurs. In 2025-2026 it took them until the last weeks of the Premier League to ensure their survival. But the economic realities were being discussed already. They stood to lose roughly $300-$350 million just for being relegated. This loss would have been devastating for the club and if it happened, a club that size would have every incentive to contest descent with every tool available. The economic impact is just too large for these clubs.
