What the old system was built to do

Part One – The Trap Door is a Business Model Problem

Part Two – The Promotion and Relegation Thesis

The classic case for promotion and relegation is simple and still very attractive. Sporting merit should decide who plays at the top. A village club with a good decade should be able to climb. A historic giant, like a Tottenham Hotspur during the 2025/26 season, that stops competing should fall. That story produces narrative, jeopardy, and a sense that the league belongs to the fans rather than to a cartel of owners.

Originally, it also produced a particular kind of club: community institutions that treated a season as a sporting contest first and a going financial concern second. Losses were absorbed by local patrons. Stadiums were municipal. Wages were not global. At the time, losses were manageable.  Television money, where it existed, was modest and shared more loosely. Relegation hurt one’s pride more than the club’s financials. It did not usually vaporize the franchise.

Modern soccer inverted those conditions. The product is now a media and commercial asset. As a lifelong fan of the game, it’s not something I like to accept.  However, it is the reality in which the game finds itself.  Wage bills are set in a global market. Stadium construction is financed from a myriad of sources, including banks, private equity and hedge funds. There is no love for the game when they make an investment.  Owners expect a return, or at least a floor under the asset. A system that can wipe out 70 to 80 percent of a club’s revenue in one summer is no longer a sporting mechanism. Parma and Rangers show how far a top-flight club can be sent when insolvency meets an open pyramid; Leeds and Portsmouth show the English version — spend like a Champions League club, then fall two divisions when the television money stops.[1]

The English pyramid: still standing, increasingly tenuous 

England is the exhibit everyone cites when they defend the open pyramid. In fact, most proponents of promotion and relegation for the United States, are largely fixated on the English experience.  Historically, it’s ground zero for the league innovation of what we call today, promotion and relegation.  It is also the exhibit that shows how expensive that defense has become.

The Premier League is a commercial success without peers in club soccer.  In the 2025/6 season, Deloitte estimated that the Premier League averaged about $9.2 billion in revenue.[2] That success has not made the pyramid healthier, however. It has made the drop more violent. Minimum Premier League distributed income sits near $135 million. A typical Championship club without parachute payments operates closer to $15 million in league money. First-year parachute payments run in the mid-$70 million range; year two around $55–60 million; year three around $27 million. Those figures exist for a reason. Without them, relegated clubs would be forced into fire sales that would make the Championship unwatchable and several clubs unviable.

Even with the designed soft landing, the Championship, in general, loses money. Deloitte’s latest Football League review put Championship operating losses at about $590 million in 2024/25, with pre-tax losses of about $480 million. Only two clubs posted a pre-tax profit.[3] League One average pre-tax losses climbed to about $10 million. League Two losses sit near $4 million a club.[4] EFL chief executive Trevor Birch has used the phrase “systemic insolvency risk.” That is not fan rhetoric. That is the league’s own language.

Parachute payments, intended as a means to soften the financial blow of being relegated, have become a second competition inside the Championship. According to data provided in the 2024-25 Football Governance Bill before the House of Commons, two-thirds of recent promotions back to the Premier League have come from clubs still on parachute payments. The open pyramid, in practice, is a two-speed Championship subsidized by the league the clubs just left.[5]

The same commercial gravity that makes relegation so violent has produced a different kind of stress at the top. Most recently in September 2026, an independent commission found Manchester City guilty of serious breaches of Premier League financial rules from 2009/10 to 2017/18, concluding that the club used commercial contracts to inflate revenues and understate costs by more than $1.2 billion in order to appear compliant with spending limits. Manchester City has appealed the ruling.  The case matters here less for whatever punishment eventually follows than for what it reveals about the actual workings of an open pyramid. Profitability rules, associated-party rules, and the new independent regulator are attempts to police revenue distribution so unequal that disguised owner funding became a rational competitive strategy. If a final sanction ever included expulsion or a points deduction large enough to force relegation, the Championship would absorb a wage bill the parachute system was never built to carry. Even if it does not, the open pyramid’s defense now depends on a regulator that can enforce its own rules against the league’s most successful club.

The knock-on effects of course, travel downward. Championship wage inflation sets the price of ambition in League One. League One losses set the price of survival in League Two. National League clubs lose about $1.3 million a year on average. Each rung spends to avoid the next drop, or to buy the next climb, because the revenue cliff is so steep that finishing mid-table is a slow bleed and finishing at the bottom is a crisis. New squad-cost rules and an independent regulator are attempts to contain a structure that keeps generating losses faster than it generates sustainable clubs.[6]

Part Four – The Super League: the elite’s answer to the same problem

Part Five – The United States, by Contrast

Part Six – A More Honest Design

Part Seven – Why the Structure Fails as a Modern Business

Part Eight – The Final Whistle


[1] Kieran Maguire estimated that relegation from a Champions League Premier League season to the Championship would cost Tottenham roughly $338–371 million in lost annual revenue (talkSPORT / Football365, February 2026; range repeated in Sports Illustrated, April 2026; original figures £250–275 million). The Athletic’s BookKeeper analysis of the club’s 2024–25 accounts ($763 million in revenue) put Championship-year income still high by second-tier standards—on the order of $405 million or more, including a ~$68 million parachute—against Premier League television money around $270 million including Europe, and sticky operating costs near $273 million (29 April 2026). Independent reconstructions from the same accounts cluster the year-one revenue gap in the $243–317 million range after parachute payments (original figures £180–235 million).

[2] Annual Review of Football Finance: Premiere League Clubs, Deloitte UK, 8 July 2026

[3] Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance — Football League Clubs (July 2026); The two clubs are – Luton Town accounts year ended 30 June 2025; Plymouth Argyle accounts 2024/25.  See the Expanded Information Section at the end of this paper for further detail.

[4] Clubs’ losses worsened across each of the EFL’s three divisions, Deloitte UK, 6 July 2026

[5] Football Governance Bill, Written Evidence Submitted by the English Football League

[6] Financial sustainability of men’s football clubs: Bigger and better – but also riskier, LCP.com  See the Expanded Information Section at the end of this paper for further detail.