Why the structure fails as a modern business

Part One – The Trap Door is a Business Model Problem

Part Two – The Promotion and Relegation Thesis

Part Three – What the Old System was Built to Do

Part Four – The Super League: the elite’s answer to the same problem

Part Five – The United States, by Contrast

Part Six – A More Honest Design

If you look at most leagues around the world, the same challenges appear to one degree or another.  No league has found a clean fix. Each one has picked a different workaround. Those workarounds are not there to improve soccer. They are there because a late-19th-century membership rule now collides with broadcast money, a global wage market, and clubs of very different size. What was designed in the 1880s is not the business the game is in today.

For all the talk of an open pyramid, the modern game does not allow for such niceties. In a pyramid that actually ran on merit alone, a club would live on what it could earn, not on a payment invented to stop it going under. Take away the solidarity payments and the losses get larger, not smaller. Parachute payments, licensing waivers, stabilization grants, owner cash infusions, all of them exist because the raw system does not pay for itself.

As was mentioned earlier, what changed was media rights.  And now we see distortions of that as well.  Broadcast and central commercial revenue pool in the first division, and inside that division they pool again around the clubs already on television. A relegated club cannot trim in time. The lines that paid a first-division wage bill disappear in one summer. Contracts, academy staff, and stadium debt do not. The P&L opens on day one. The cost cut arrives a year late, if it arrives.

Below that, the size of the prize for being promoted writes the losses in advance. If going up is worth that much, a rational owner in the second tier spends past break-even to buy the ticket. Most of them are spending next year’s revenue against this year’s table. That is not always bad management. It is what the pyramid pays them to do. Championship operating losses of about $590 million highlight the cost of not just competition, but the battle to be promoted.

The same drop starves longer term projects. A training ground, a stand, a commercial deal with a five-year tail all assume the club will still be selling the same product. Relegation does not only cut revenue. It cuts the reason to build. Australia’s Bradley Report flagged this in 1990. It has not become less true because we don’t like the conclusion.

And the relief valves, by their necessity, spoil the integrity of the holy open system. Parachute clubs turn the Championship into two leagues. Japan’s licenses keep insolvent clubs playing week in and week out. Liga MX paid Ascenso clubs a stipend to give up on promotion. Each fix creates the next complaint. None of them puts the second tier on the same economic footing as the first.

In the United States, the challenges go beyond just fixing the balance sheet.  We are dealing with a legacy of the game that has been far from successful, until Major League Soccer, a history of failed leagues and clubs, and a fickle fan base that as a rule, don’t support local, lower division clubs.  There are exceptions to that rule, but they are still exceptions.  And while there are differences between the first and second division, the differences are not what is choking an open pyramid.  What is choking is the disparity between the two that grows more pronounced year over year.

Unlike all other leagues around the world, the geographical challenges is not a question of distance, but of cost.  According to frequently cited statistics from the 2015 season, MLS Clubs travel an average of 1,058 miles a game… one way.  This is roughly 2x what a team in the premier league will travel on its longest road trip.  The math on travel alone for a season with 15 away games it looks like this –

Major League Soccer clubs face some of the longest travel distances in domestic professional sports. Based on historical data and league analysis, the average distance traveled for an away game is approximately 1,058 miles (one-way), which is nearly twice the length of the longest road trip in the English Premier League.

If we just applied the going IRS rate[1] to calculate total travel cost for one game, it would look something like this –

MLS = 1,058 x .76 cents = $804.08 per person.  40 people travelling = $32,163.20 per road trip.  And if you travel for 20 away games, the total bill for the season is $643,264 a year.  And that does not include hotels, food and ground transportation.

MLS and its clubs can absorb these types of expenses.  USL clubs on the other hand are in a more tenuous position to manage these costs.  But that’s not these aren’t the only expenses for their clubs.  The entire league has been unstable, and clubs find it difficult to survive without strong ownership.  Even the perceived “successful” club’s struggle.  Detroit City FC, a USL Championship Club, is by most measures a model club.  Roots to the community, successful on and off the field, and a stadium.  And yet, despite that, they lose, according to co-owner Sean Mann, roughly $4 million dollars a year.[2]

Even if you regionalize the lower divisions, distance travel is still an issue. And at some point, at least in a third division like USL’s League One, the league must have a national footprint.   Otherwise, the commercial opportunities are severely limited. This shouldn’t be news as this is the way of the world – First Divisions revenues are significantly higher than lower divisions by an order of magnitude.  Expenses, it would follow, are higher, so the ability to cover those expenses is possible. 

The list above highlights the revenue differentials and compares expenses between the listed leagues and the second divisions within those countries.  Not science, but the revenue deltas are so dramatic, you can understand that liabilities would follow suit.

The reality is you can govern this more honestly. Truth is you cannot govern it back into balance while one season can remove most of the revenue and none of the cost. Every league that has promotion and relegation has simply picked which distortion mechanism it will tolerate. England came up with parachute and solidarity payments. Japan picked license waivers. Mexico picked a closed door and a check. That was not fear, and it was not a failure of imagination. It is an 1880s rule running into a labor market and a media market it was not built for.

For the United States to implement a version of promotion and relegation would require financial cooperation across all professional clubs in a way that has never been witnessed before.  It would require a heavy dose of financial interdependence in a country that is mired with club instability and distress.  The notion that an open pyramid, as pined for by soccer purists, would solve all of this ignores reality on the ground.  And if the pinnacle of an “open system” like that found in the UK can’t keep 94% of clubs teetering on the edge of insolvency, how ca   n we expect a different outcome?

Part Eight – The Final Whistle


[1] Standard mileage rates, IRS.com

[2] Reuter, Jeff.  Folding teams, a labor fight, and … expansion? The USL’s structure allows for it all to happen.  The Guardian.10 March 2026