The United States, by contrast

Part One – The Trap Door is a Business Model Problem

Part Two – The Promotion and Relegation Thesis

Part Three – What the Old System was Built to Do

Part Four – The Super League: the elite’s answer to the same problem

Founded in 1993 as a condition of hosting the 1994 World Cup, Major League Soccer was supposed to kick off in 1995 with 12 teams. Markets, sponsors, and investor-operators weren’t ready. The league opened in 1996 with ten clubs. DC United won the first title. Chicago and Miami arrived in 1998.[1]

The World Cup afterglow was real, but like all good things, it faded. From that point MLS had to sell itself, not the memory of 1994.

Stability came the American way. Lamar Hunt built Crew Stadium and opened it on 15 May 1999.  It became known as the first soccer-specific stadium in the country.[2] The league grew to 16 teams in 2010, 20 in 2015, 26 in 2020. By the late 2010s average crowds were over 20,000, ahead of the NBA and NHL on a per-game basis.[3] This growth was sustained by the steadily increasing popularity of soccer among the American public. That is the closed model taken to its commercial end: expansion fees north of $500 million, salary rules, no relegation, franchise values that compound.

USL’s move toward internal promotion and relegation is the interesting experiment, because it tries to import sporting jeopardy inside a closed pyramid without asking MLS owners to put billion-dollar licenses on a bad season. That split is the point. Whether the model can deliver club stability is an open question. Clubs in this country have a habit of arriving and leaving like passing cars. [4]

Truthfully, the model for the USL plan doesn’t exist anywhere.  There is no real closed pyramid… within a larger pyramid that is US soccer … that allows for sporting jeopardy through promotion and relegation but also tries to temper the financial risks that are inherent in that system.  If the USL can gather momentum, it could be the catalyst for a broader conversation around promotion and relegation, but if sporting jeopardy continues to create club fiscal instability as it currently does, then I suspect promotion and relegation will not be long for its time here in the United States.

The country had already lived a more European-looking first chapter. From the 1870s, soccer in the United States was an immigrant industrial sport — mill towns, company teams, ethnic clubs in Kearny, Fall River, St. Louis, and the rest of the Northeast corridor. The American Soccer League of the 1920s was the high-water mark. The “Soccer Wars” and Depression ended it.[5] Bethlehem Steel folded in 1930; the original ASL died in 1933. By World War II the game had retreated to ethnic parks and company fields. It was not a college fad that failed. It was a working-class sport that lost its economic base just as baseball and college football locked in the culture.

After the war the durable growth was suburban and youth, not a second professional league.   This is where the United States would begin its journey to become the largest youth soccer country in the world.

The 1966 World Cup, shown on U.S. television, convinced investors there was a market. In 1967 two rival leagues launched: the FIFA-sanctioned United Soccer Association (which imported entire European and South American clubs and gave them local names) and the National Professional Soccer League (which had a CBS deal that flopped in the ratings). They merged in December 1967 into the North American Soccer League. The 1968 NASL had 17 teams; by 1969 it was down to five. It was rebuilt slowly under commissioner Phil Woosnam.

The NASL peaked around 1977–1980: 24 teams at its largest, league-average attendance in the 13,000–14,000 range for several seasons, and network television. Then it overexpanded. New owners paid modest franchise fees; many lacked soccer knowledge or deep pockets and expected NFL-style instant success. Clubs spent heavily copying the Cosmos.  Then the early-1980s recession hit.

The NASL’s failure was financial and structural with too many weak franchises, no sustainable domestic talent pipeline at the pro level, costs that outran revenues, and a product that never fully converted casual curiosity into year-after-year ticket buyers outside a few markets. What survived was youth soccer, college programs, and a generation that grew up with a ball. That base made 1994 and MLS possible. It did not make an open pyramid solvent. MLS protected the license because the last open-ended professional experiment had just taught owners what promotion and relegation costs when the market cannot underwrite the drop.

Part Six – A More Honest Design

Part Seven – Why the Structure Fails as a Modern Business

Part Eight – The Final Whistle


[1] Kalso, Reed.  Research Starter – Major League Soccer.  Published 2019.  This is a comprehensive history of the major events and issues of Major League Soccer.

[2] Truth be told, it is not. The first soccer-specific stadium in the United States was Mark’s Stadium, built in North Tiverton, Rhode Island, in 1922 by Fall River Marksmen owner Sam Mark. With a capacity of 15,000, it is widely recognized by historians as the first purpose-built soccer venue in the country, though it was demolished in the 1950s.

[3] Historic Crew Stadium.  Wikipedia.com  Built in 1999, it was the first soccer-specific stadium built by a Major League Soccer team, starting an important trend in MLS stadium construction.

[4] In 2023, I looked at the last 163 clubs that have ceased operations, regardless of league.  The reality is that 40% of those clubs were irrelevant, meaning fans didn’t show up.  The smaller the club the more dependent it is on ticket revenue.  And if fans don’t support the team, the economics are too much to sustain.  Some of this is discussed in an episode for my YouTube Channel, All Things Division III Soccer. 

[5] The Soccer War occurred in the United States between 1928 and 1929.  This was not a military conflict but a professional dispute between the United States Football Association (USFA) and the American Soccer League (ASL) over control of the sport, culminating in the ASL withdrawing from the National Challenge Cup before eventually merging into the Atlantic Coast League.